By exploiting multipath fading channels as a source of common randomness, physical layer (PHY) based key generation protocols allow two terminals with correlated observations to generate secret keys with information-theoretical security. The state of the art, however, still suffers from major limitations, e.g., low key generation rate, lower entropy of key bits and a high reliance on node mobility. In this paper, a novel cooperative key generation protocol is developed to facilitate high-rate key generation in narrowband fading channels, where two keying nodes extract the phase randomness of the fading channel with the aid of relay node(s). For the first time, we explicitly consider the effect of estimation methods on the extraction of secret key bits from the underlying fading channels and focus on a popular statistical method-maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). The performance of the cooperative key generation scheme is extensively evaluated theoretically. We successfully establish both a theoretical upper bound on the maximum secret key rate from mutual information of correlated random sources and a more practical upper bound from Cramer-Rao bound (CRB) in estimation theory. Numerical examples and simulation studies are also presented to demonstrate the performance of the cooperative key generation system. The results show that the key rate can be improved by a couple of orders of magnitude compared to the existing approaches.
problems to achieve secure key generation. This body of cryptographic protocols achieve computational security.
Recently, the notion of physical layer (PHY) based key generation has been proposed and the resulting approaches serve as alternative solutions to the key establishment problem in wireless networks. Based on the theory of reciprocity of antennas and electromagnetic propagation, the channel responses between two transceivers can be used as a source of common randomness that is not available to adversaries in other locations. Such source of secrecy, which is provided by the fading process of wireless channels, can help to achieve information-theoretical security. This body of work can be traced back to the original information-theoretical formulation of secure communication due to [1] . Building on information theory and following [1] , information theorists characterized the fundamental bounds and showed the feasibility of generating secrets using auxiliary random sources [2] , [3] , [4] . However, they are almost all based on theoretical results and do not present explicit constructions. To the best of our knowledge, Hershey et al. proposed the first key generation scheme based on differential phase detection in [5] . Using multipath channels as the source of common randomness, recent researches focus on measuring a popular statistic of wireless channel, i.e., received signal strength (RSS), for extracting shared secret bits between node pairs [6] , [7] , [8] . It has been demonstrated that these RSS based methods are feasible on customized 802.11 platforms. The state of the art, however, still suffers from major limitations. First, the key bit generation rate supported by these approaches is very low. This is due to the fact that the PHY based key generation relies on channel variations or node mobility to extract high entropy bits. In the time intervals where channel changes slowly, only a limited number of key bits can be extracted. The resulting low key rate significantly limits their practical application given the intermittent connectivity in mobile environments. Second, the generated raw key bit stream has low randomness. This is because the distribution of the RSS measurements or estimates is not uniform, which results in unequally likely bits after quantization. As cryptographic keys need to be as random as possible so that it is infeasible to reproduce them or predict them, it is important to ensure high entropy of the generated keys. However, the problem of how to safely and efficiently generate random key bits using channel randomness is still open.
To overcome the above limitations, in this paper, we investigate the problem of cooperative key generation between two nodes with the aid of third parties, i.e., relay nodes. The introduction of the relay nodes is motivated by the diversity 0733-8716/12/$31.00 c 2012 IEEE gain provided by the relay nodes, which can potentially help to increase the key rate by furnishing the two nodes additional correlated randomness. To enhance the level of entropy of bit sequences, we propose to exploit the uniformly distributed channel phase for key generation. Specifically, we develop a novel time-slotted cooperative key generation scheme by exploiting channel phase randomness under narrowband fading channels. For the first time, we explicitly consider the effect of estimation methods on the extraction of secret key bits from the underlying fading channels and focus on a popular statistical method-maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). The main features of the proposed scheme are: i) The key bit generation rate is improved by a couple of orders of magnitude compared to RSS based approaches. This is due to the high-accuracy MLE and the fact that the random channels between the relay and the keying nodes can be effectively utilized during a single coherence time. That also implies the proposed scheme can even work in a static environment where channels change very slowly; ii) The generated bit stream is very close to a truly random sequence due to the use of uniformly distributed channel phase for bit generation; iii) It is robust to relay node compromise attacks since each relay node only contributes a small portion of key bits and a small number of them can never obtain the complete global key bit information even collectively. We successfully establish both a theoretical upper bound on the maximum secret key rate from mutual information of correlated random sources and a more practical upper bound from Cramer-Rao bound (CRB) in estimation theory. We also show that the cooperative gain in the key generation is similar to the beamforming gain in cooperative networking, i.e., the resulting gain is linear to the number of relay nodes. Numerical examples and simulation studies are also presented to demonstrate the performance of the cooperative key generation system. The results show that the key rate can be improved by a couple of orders of magnitude compared to the existing approaches.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND PRELIMINARIES

A. Problem Formulation
In a multipath fading wireless environment, the physical signals transmitted between a transmitter-receiver pair rapidly decorrelate in space, time and frequency. That implies that it is very hard for a third party to predict the channel state between the legitimate parties, i.e., an eavesdropper at a third location (e.g., one half of wavelength away) cannot observe the same channel response information. This channel uniqueness property of the transmitter-receiver pair offers potential security guarantee. Further, the channel reciprocity indicates the availability of using common randomness between the transmitterreceiver pair: the electromagnetic waves traveling in both directions will undergo the same physical perturbations. That implies that in a time-division duplex (TDD) system, if the transmitter-receiver pair operates on the same frequency in both directions, the channel states/channel impulse responses observed at two ends will theoretically be the same. Based on these two observations, we can see that there exists a natural random source in wireless communications for secrecy extraction.
Consider two parties A and B (we term them as keying nodes in the following discussion) that want to establish a symmetrical key between them in the presence of an eavesdropper E. The keying nodes are assumed to be halfduplex in the sense that they cannot transmit and receive signals at the same frequency simultaneously. In the first timeslot, A transmits a signal x A to B, and E can also hear this signal over the wireless channel. In the second timeslot, B transmits a signal x B to A, and E can also hear this signal over the wireless channel. The channel from node i to node j is modeled as a multipath fading model with channel impulse h i,j (t). We assume channel reciprocity in the forward and reverse directions during the coherence time such that h i,j (t) = h j,i (t) and the underlying noise in each channel is additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). In wireless communications, coherence time is a statistical measure of the time duration over which the channel impulse response is essentially invariant, and it quantifies the similarity of the channel response at different times.
The keying nodes A and B compute the sufficient statistiĉ r B andr A , respectively, and generate the secret key based on these observations. In our system, we assume there exist N relay nodes, which are honest and will help and cooperate with the keying nodes A and B to generate secret keys. On the other side, the eavesdropper E knows the whole key generation protocol and can eavesdrop all the communications between legitimate nodes (i.e., A, B and relay nodes). Based on communication theory [9] , the signals transmitted between A and B and the signals transmitted between A (B) and E, which are at least λ/2 away from the network nodes, experience independent fading. Following the same assumptions in existing key generation schemes [6] , [8] , [10] , we assume that the adversary E aims to derive the secret key generated between legitimate nodes and further steal the transmitted private information in the future. Those active attacks where the attacker tampers the transmissions are orthogonal to our research and thus not considered in this paper.
B. Narrowband and Wideband Fading Channels
In this paper, we will focus on a narrowband fading system for secret key generation. Our approach can also apply to wideband fading channels. But as will be shown, it suits best for narrowband fading channel model. Let the transmitted signal be
whereũ(t) is the complex envelope of x(t) with bandwidth B and f c is its carrier frequency. Assume the equivalent lowpass time-varying channel impulse response is h(τ, t) = N (t) n=0 α n (t)e −jφn(t) δ(τ − τ n (t)), the received signal can be written as
where α n (t) is a function of path loss and shadowing while φ n (t) depends on delay, Doppler, and carrier offset. Typically, it is assumed that these two random processes α n (t) and φ n (t) are independent. Note N (t) is the number of resolvable multipath components. For narrowband fading channels, each term in the sum of Eq. (1) results from nonresolvable multipath components. Under most delay spread characterizations, ν 1/B implies that the delay associated with the kth multipath
. If x(t) is assumed to be an unmodulated carrier (single-tone signal) x(t) = R{e j2πfct } = cos 2πf c t, it is narrowband for any ν. With these assumptions, the received signal becomes
where the in-phase and quadrature components are given by
n=1 α n (t) sin φ n (t), respectively. The in-phase and quadrature components of Rayleigh fading process are jointly Gaussian random process. The complex "lowpass" equivalent signal for r(t) is given by r
Consider the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) in the channel, Eq. (2) can be written as
where n(t) is a Gaussian noise process with power spectral density N0 2 . We will estimate parameters in r(t) and use the uniformly distributed phase of multipath channel for key generation.
III. THE PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
In this section, we present our cooperative key generation algorithms for extracting secret bits from wireless channels. The proposed algorithms employ the technique of single-tone parameter estimation to estimate the uniformly distributed channel phase.
A. Utilizing a Single Relay
We fist consider the single relay case where one relay node acts as a helper to facilitate the key generation between the keying nodes A and B. The basic idea is that an unmodulated carrier (i.e., single-tone signal) is transmitted through the fading channels back and forth between the keying nodes, and the keying nodes perform maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) based on their observations. Since each bidirectional channel between a pair of nodes is a time-division-duplex (TDD) channel, which is reciprocal in both directions, it will incur the same total phase shift caused by multipath due to the channel reciprocity principle. Generally, the protocol consists of two main phases: i) Single-tone phase estimation and quantization; ii) Key reconciliation and privacy amplification.
Before we introduce the cooperative key generation protocol, we first introduce the fundamental building block-MLE used in single-tone signal parameter estimations. The MLE is implemented in three steps: 1) Rough frequency search, 2) Fine frequency search, and 3) Phase estimation.
The performance of MLE is measured by the variance of the estimation errors. This variance can be lower-bounded by the Cramer-Rao bound (CRB) [11] . The performance of the ML estimator, which is closely related to the performance of the proposed cooperative key generation scheme, will be discussed and analyzed later. We present the cooperative key generation protocol as follows: Phase One: Single-tone phase estimation and quantization. TS 1 : The protocol begins in timeslot 1 with transmission of a sinusoidal primary beacon of duration T 1 from node A:
To simplify the exposition, we assume t 1 = 0 in the following discussion, i.e., the protocol starts at time zero point.
Node
where τ AB (τ AR1 ) denotes the delay of the shortest path and ν AB (ν AR1 ) denotes the finite delay spread of the channel h A,B (t) (h A,R1 (t)). In order to achieve a steady-state response at both B and R 1 , it is required that
The "steady-state" portion of the beacons received at B and R 1 can be written as
, and n AB (t) (n AR1 (t)) denotes the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) in the A → B (A → R 1 ) channel. α AB (α AR1 ) and θ AB (θ AR1 ) are the steady-state gain and the phase response of channel h A,B (t) (h A,R1 (t)), respectively. At the end of primary beacon, a final transient response of the multipath channel is also received by
uses only the steady-state portion of the noisy observation to compute ML estimates of the received frequency and phase, which are denoted byŵ AB (ŵ AR1 ) andθ AB (θ AR1 ), respectively. TS 2 : Upon the conclusion of the primary beacon r AB (t), in timeslot 2, B begins the transmission of a sinusoidal secondary beacon at
The secondary beacon transmitted by B at t 2 can be written as
) due to channel reciprocity. In order to achieve a steady-state response at both A and R 1 , T 2 > max{ν BA , ν BR1 } is required. The steady-state portion of the beacons received at B and R 1 can be written as
are the steady-state gain and the phase response of channel h B,A (t) (h B,R1 (t)), respectively. At the end of this beacon, a final transient response of the multipath channel is received by
Similar to TS 1 , A (R 1 ) uses only the steady-state portion of the noisy observation to compute ML estimates of the received frequency and phase, which are denoted byŵ BA (ŵ BR1 ) and θ BA (θ BR1 ), respectively. TS 3 : Upon the conclusion of the primary beacon r BR1 (t), in timeslot 3, R 1 begins the transmission of a sinusoidal secondary beacon at t 3 
The third beacon transmitted by R 1 at t 3 can be written as
) due to channel reciprocity. In order to achieve a steady-state response at both A and B, T 3 > max{ν R1A , ν R1B } is required. The steady-state portion of the beacons received at A and B can be written as
, and n R1A (t) (n R1B (t)) denotes the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) in the
are the steady-state gain and the phase response of channel h R1,A (t) (h R1,B (t)), respectively. At the end of this beacon, a final transient response of the multipath channel is received by
Similar to TS 2 , A (B) uses only the steady-state portion of the noisy observation to compute ML estimates of the received frequency and phase, which are denoted byŵ R1A (ŵ R1B ) and θ R1A (θ R1B ), respectively.
Quantization. To generate high-entropy bits, we assume A, B and R 1 run the above steps once during each coherence time interval. For ease of exposition, we term the above steps as round 1. After round 1, each of the three nodes has two phase estimates for quantization
Each node uniformly maps its phase estimates into the quantization interval/index using the following formula:
for k = 1, 2, . . . , q. Therefore, in the first round, the quantization of each phase value generates log 2 (q) secret bits. Due to channel reciprocity principle, A and B share log 2 (q) bits generated fromθ BA (θ AB ); A and R 1 share log 2 (q) bits generated fromθ R1A (θ AR1 ); B and R 1 share log 2 (q) bits generated fromθ R1B (θ BR1 ). Note the quantization index k is encoded into bit vectors. In our implementation, we use gray codes to reduce the bit error probability (BER). Assume the desired key size is |K|. For round k = 2, 3, . . . , |K| 2 log 2 (q) , A, B and R 1 repeat the operations as in TS 1 , TS 2 and TS 3 to generate phase estimates and convert them into bit vectors through q-level quantization.
After |K| 2 log 2 (q) rounds, a key of size |K| 2 is shared between A and B, which is denoted as K 1 . Similarly, a key of size |K| 2 is shared between A and R 1 , which is denoted as K 2 ; a key of size |K| 2 is shared between B and R 1 , which is denoted as K 3 . Then R 1 computes K 2 ⊕ K 3 and transmits it over the public channel. A receives the XOR information and computes
Finally, A and B set the final key as K 1 ||K 2 or K 1 ||K 3 , and a secret key with size |K| is established. Note that we use either K 2 or K 3 instead of both as the component of the final key. The reason is that with either one of K 2 and K 3 the eavesdropper can recover the other one by leveraging
Phase Two: Key reconciliation and privacy amplification.
Due to reciprocity principle, the generated bit sequence at A and B should be identical. However, there may exist a small number of bit discrepancies due to estimation errors, hardware variations and half-duplex beacon transmission. These error bits can be corrected using key reconciliation techniques [12] , [13] . Assume A and B hold K and K , respectively. And the Hamming distance dis(K, K ) ≤ t. Following Code-offset construction in [13] , we use a [n, k, 2t + 1] 2 error-correcting code C to correct errors in K even though K may not be in C. When performing key reconciliation, node A randomly selects a codeword c from C and computes secure sketch SS(K) = s = K ⊕ c. Then s is sent to node B. Upon receiving s, node B subtracts the shift s from K and gets Rec(K , s) = c = K ⊕ s. Then node B decodes c to get c, and computes K by shifting back to get K = c ⊕ s. Note that since the error-correcting information s is public to both the communicating nodes and the adversary, it can be used by the adversary to guess portions of the generated key [8] .
To cope with this problem, A and B can further run privacy amplification protocols [12] to recover the entropy loss.
B. Exploiting Multiple Relays
In this subsection, we present the key generation protocol with multiple relay nodes. With the aid of N relay nodes, the protocol has a total of N + 2 timeslots for each round (during one coherence time interval T c ). Assume the coherence time are roughly divided to N + 2 portions, each with length Tc N +2 . The activities in each timeslot of round 1 are as follows (for ease of exposition, we ignore the explicit value of t i for i = 1, 2, . . . , N + 2):
1) In TS 1 , node A transmits a sinusoidal primary beacon x 1 (t). Node B (R j , j = {1, 2, . . . , N}) neglects the initial and final transient portions of the received signal and uses the steady portion to compute the channel phase estimatesθ AB (θ AR k ).
2) In TS 2 , node B transmits a sinusoidal secondary beacon x 2 (t). Node A (R j , j = {1, 2, . . . , N}) neglects the initial and final transient portions of the received signal and uses the steady portion to compute the channel phase estimatesθ BA (θ BRj ).
3) In TS i (i = {3, 4, . . . , N + 2}), node R k (j = {1, 2, . . . , N}) alternately transmits a sinusoidal beacon x i (t). Nodes A and B neglect the initial and final transient portions of the received signal and use the steady portion to compute the channel phase estimatesθ Rj A (θ RjB ) for j = {1, 2, . . . , N}.
Assume the desired key size is |K|. For round k = 2, 3, . . . , |K| (N +1) log 2 (q) , A, B and R 1 repeat the operations as in TS 1 , TS 2 , . . . , TS N +2 to generate phase estimates and convert them into bit vectors through q-level quantization. After |K| (N +1) log 2 (q) rounds, a key of size |K| N +1 is shared between A and B, which is denoted as K 1 . Similarly, a key of size |K| N +1 is shared between A and R j (j = {1, 2, . . . , N}), which is denoted as K j1 ; a key of size |K| N +1 is shared between B and R j (j = {1, 2, . . . , N}), which is denoted as K j2 . Then R j computes K j1 ⊕ K j2 and transmits it over the public channel. A receives the XOR information and computes K j1 ⊕ (K j1 ⊕K j2 ) = K j2 . Similarly, B obtains K j1 by K j2 ⊕(K j1 ⊕ K j2 ) = K j1 . Now both A and B have 2N + 1 keys K 1 , K j1 and K j2 for j = {1, 2, . . . , N}.
Finally, A and B set the final key as K 1 ||(K 11 or K 12 )||(K 21 or K 22 )|| · · · ||(K N 1 or K N 2 ).
The key reconciliation and privacy amplification phase is the same as the single relay case. Note that since a single coherence time interval is evenly allocated to the keying nodes and relay nodes, the increase of N results in the decrease of available observation time T o (beacon duration T i ). As will be shown later, this would lead to the increase of estimation errors in MLE. Therefore, there must exist an optimal maximum N under which key rate is maximized.
IV. THEORETICAL PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the performance of the cooperative key generation protocol in terms of the maximum key rate the system can achieve.
A. Knowing the Limit: The Upper Bound on Key Rate from Mutual Information
In this subsection, we analyze the mutual information between the observations of two nodes i and j at two ends of a multipath fading channel. We start the analysis from the no-relay case. As shown above, all the received signals can be expressed as Eq. (4). These single-tone signals can be precisely reconstructed from samples taken at sampling rate greater or equal at Nyquist rate f s = 1 Ts = 2f c (Note in the following analysis, we choose f s 2f c ). The discrete-time observation at nodes i and j are (5) for m = 0, 1, . . . , N s − 1, where t ij (t ji ) denotes the time of the first sample. Note that when there is no relay, nodes A and B each can generate N s samples by fully exploiting the coherence time interval. That is, if we neglect the transmission delay, delay spread and processing delay, the observation time (i.e., beacon duration) is
] denote the samples obtained at nodes j and i, respectively. According to [10] , I(r ij (t); r ji (t)) = I(R ij ; R ji ) as r(t) is fully defined by R.
In practice, given a set X of independent identically distributed data conditioned on an unknown parameter θ, a sufficient statistic is a function T (X) whose value contains all the information needed to compute any estimate of the parameter (e.g. a maximum likelihood estimate (MLE)). For ease of exposition, we rewrite Eq. (4) here
In MLE estimation, |h| cos(2πf c t + θ) + n(t) is sampled to estimate |h| and θ, where the complex expression of multipath channel is h = |h|e jθ . Once |h| and θ are obtained, the terms |h| cos θ cos 2πf c t and |h| sin θ sin 2πf c t are both determined. So it is equivalent to sample and estimate a signal like |h| cos θ cos 2πf c t or |h| sin θ sin 2πf c t to fully determine the fading channel information. The "equivalent" received signals at nodes i and j can be written as , respectively. Now the problem becomes a Gaussion random variable estimation problem, where the in-phase component r I (t) = |h| cos θ = α cos θ is to be estimated (in the following, we abuse standard notation by letting h I denote the in-phase component). Let S i = S j = [a cos(w c (0T s )), a cos(w c (1T s )), . . . , a cos(w c (mT s ))]. Both nodes i and j can compute a sufficient statistic R ji and R ij for R ji and R ij respectively [14] 
where||S j || 2 = S T j · S j and ||S i || 2 = S T i · S i .
Theorem 1: Let h I ji , h I ij ∼ N(0, σ 2 h ) and N i , N j ∼ N (0, σ 2 ). Based on sufficient statistics ( R ji , R ij ) at two ends, nodes i and j can generate secret key bits at rate
where P denotes the transmission power, N s denotes the number of samples and T c is the coherence time. Proof: Due to page length limitation, the detailed proof is provided in the technical report [15] .
In the above discussions, we focus on two nodes i and j with no relay node. We next analyze the key rate when there are N relay nodes. If the sampling rate f s is fixed, the coherence time T c which contains 2N s samples is divided into N + 2 shares. From the nodes A and B's point of view, each of them "sends" 2Ns N +2 samples. Thus, the cooperative key generate rate is
Although the mutual information between each node pair decreases due to the reduction of number of samples, the relay nodes help A and B to establish more key components, this gain becomes more significant when SNR increases or the channel changes very slowly. We have the following theorem 
where R MI s = R MI k . As we can see, the gain of cooperative key generation is similar to the beamforming gain in cooperative networking, which is linear to the number of relay nodes.
B. A More Practical Bound: The Upper Bound on Key Rate from Cramer-Rao bound (CRB)
We next compute a more practical and tighter bound on key rate from Cramer-Rao bound (CRB) in estimation theory. One of the most important properties of Maximum Likelihood estimators (MLE) is that it attains the Cramer-Rao bound at least asymptotically. Similarly, starting from the no-relay case, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 3: When maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) and uniform quantization are used, the expected key rate is upper-bounded by
where P QIA is the average probability of quantization index agreement.
Proof: Due to page length limitation, the detailed proof is provided in the technical report [15] .
When there are N relay nodes, the number of samples at each node is N co s = 2Ns N +2 . We substitute N s for N co s and obtain the new CRB forθ. This bound is used to calculate P co QIA . Thus, the expected key rate for cooperative key generation becomes
It is easy to see that as q increases, node i and j could generate a longer bit vector during the same coherence time T c . However, due to estimation errors the probability of generating the same bit vector becomes less. We can derive the maximum key agreement rate when q satisfies
From the above discussion, we conclude that there exists an optimal q at which maximum key rate can be achieved. We demonstrate how key rate changes as a function of q through simulations in Section V.
C. Numerical Illustration on Theoretical Upper Bounds
Assume coherence time T c = 14ms. The example in Fig. 1 (a) presents the two upper bounds on key rate between two nodes (i.e., no relay) as the observation time T o increases. The results show that the upper bound derived from mutual information serves as the universal upper bound on key rate. As expected, with a fixed number of quantization levels, the increase of SNR or T o leads to the increase of key rate. Since there are only two nodes, the observation time for each node can be up to 7ms. When T o changes from 0 to 2.4ms, key rate increases rapidly, and it increases almost linearly as a function of T o after 2.4ms. Hence, a less observation time can be properly chosen to still maintain an acceptable level of key rate. On the other hand, while the maximum T o is constrained by T c /2, one can further enhance the key rate by increasing SNR. Fig. 1 (b) plots the upper bounds on key rate when the number of relays N increases. The close match of the bound from mutual information and the bound from CRB before N = 500 shows that, the CRB can be used to efficiently approach the universal upper bound when the nodes use ML phase estimation. Recall that as N increases, the observation time T o for each node decreases because the whole coherence time are equally distributed to the keying nodes and relay nodes. Due to the fact that the decrease of T o causes more estimation errors, there exists a threshold on key rate. This can be clearly observed from the results: the bound based on CRB gradually achieves the maximum and decreases after N = 2500. For the sake of clearly illustrating the inflection point on the bound curve from CRB, we limit the range of N in the figure. In fact, there also exists a inflection point on the bound curve from mutual information when N goes to infinity.
V. SIMULATION STUDIES
A. Key Rate and Bit Error Probability
This section presents simulation results of the cooperative key generation protocol in multipath fading channels. In our simulation, we sample the beacon signal with sampling rate f s = 3f c , where f c = 900 MHz is the carrier frequency of the single-tone signal. In a mobile scenario, we assume the moving speed v = 10m/s. Thus, the Doppler frequency shift is f d = v λ = 30Hz, which results in a coherence time T c = 0.423 f d = 14ms. Assume ν is the delay spread with a typical value 1.2 × 10 −6 s and the distance d between nodes changes from 2m to 10m. Thus, the random propagation delay τ = d c = 6.67ns ∼ 33.3ns. We choose T o much larger than the delay spread ν so that steady-state response can be achieved. Two different methods are used here to estimate the variance of the phase estimation error: (i) full ML estimation and (ii) approximate analytical predictions using CRB.
The first example considers the effect of quantization level q on key rate. Fig. 1 (c) plots the key rate versus q given SNR =25dB and T o =7.5μs using both the CRB analytical predictions and simulations. The results show two regimes of operation. In the small-quantization level regime, the effect of log 2 q dominates the key rate. In this regime, the probability that two estimates fall into the same interval P QIA is very high. Thus, the increase of q leads to the increase of key rate. According to Eq. (12), when q begins to exceed a threshold, the key rate begins to decrease and enters into the large-quantization level regime. In this regime, the key rate decreases quickly as q further increases. This is due to the fact that the estimation errors dominate the performance as the length of each interval 2π q decreases, i.e., P QIA is very sensitive to the estimation errors when the length of interval is small. As might be expected, the CRB can be used to efficiently predict the performance when q is relatively small, e.g., q < 10 3 in this setting. Since CRB is a lower bound on the variance of the estimation error, it takes a much larger q to reach the inflexion point compared to the simulation results. The above result intuitively suggests that an optimal q can be chosen to maximize the key rate. To evaluate the BER performance, Fig. 2 (a) plots the bit error probability between two nodes as a function of q. The results show that, with a fixed T o = 7.5μs, p e can be maintained at a very low level if q < 100. We can use Gray codes (one bit of error is introduced between adjacent sectors) to encode the quantization indices to reduce p e . Also note that in these results, the coherence time is not fully exploited (i.e., the observation time T o = 7.5 μs T c ), so one can also reduce p e so as to increase key rate by setting a larger T o . Fig. 2 (b) plots bit error probability p e as a function of observation time T o under SNR= 25 dB and q = 16. The results show that the increase of T o is equivalent to the increase of SNR, which results in a close match of simulation results and CRB. Fig. 2 (c) plots the key rate of the cooperative key generation protocol as the number of relay nodes increases when the quantization levels is fixed at q = 16. We choose T o = 11 μs to maintain a high level of estimation accuracy. The results show that key rate increases linearly as a function of N , which confirms our previous analysis that the gain of cooperative key generation scales with the number of relays. As a final point on the results, we note that the further increase of SNR (e.g., from 25 dB to 40 dB) does not help much to improve the performance. This is because the estimation accuracy is already high enough when choosing a short q and a reasonable value of T o . 
B. Key Randomness
As we discussed above, the proposed cooperative key generation scheme employs the inherent randomness of uniformly distributed channel phases in multipath narrowband fading channels. We employ a widely used randomness test suite NIST to verify the randomness of the secret-bit generated from our simulation [16] . To pass the test, all p-values must be greater than 0.01. In the test, we randomly select 10 bit sequences generated from our simulation and compute their pvalues for 8 tests. The results in Table I show that the average entropy of our generated bit sequences is very close to a truly random sequence.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we provide a security discussion for the proposed cooperative key generation scheme. We have the following theorem:
Theorem 4: The cooperative key generation scheme is secure, i.e., the resulting secret key is effectively concealed from the eavesdropper observing the public information:
1 N + 1 I(M 0 , M 1 , M 2 , . . . , M N ; K AB , K 11 , K 21 , . . . , K N 1 ) ≤ Proof: Due to page length limitation, the detailed proof is provided in the technical report [15] .
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a novel cooperative key generation protocol was developed to facilitate high-rate key generation in narrowband fading channels, where two keying nodes extract the phase randomness of the fading channel with the aid of relay node(s). We successfully established both a theoretical upper bound on the maximum secret key rate from mutual information of correlated random sources and a more practical upper bound from Cramer-Rao bound (CRB) in estimation theory. Numerical examples and simulation studies were also presented to demonstrate the performance of the cooperative key generation system. The results show that the key rate can be improved by a couple of orders of magnitude compared to the existing approaches.
